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Abstract
We investigate common knowledge equilibrium of separable (or parity) and to-
tally symmetric Boolean securities in distributed information market. We the-
oretically show that clearing price converges to the true value when a common
prior probability distribution of information of each player satisfies some condi-
tions.
Keywords: Distributed information market; Common knowledge equilibrium
1. Introduction
Common knowledge is that all agents know, that all agents know that all
agents know, and so on ad infinitum [1, 2]. The concept of common knowledge
was first introduced mathematically by Aumann in 1976 [3]. By using the
concept, he proved that if all agents have the same prior distribution, and their
posteriors for an event are common knowledge, then these posteriors are equal.
After his pioneering work, Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis proved that even
though posteriors of agents are initially different, iterative announcement and
revision process of posteriors leads to the state where posteriors of all agents
are equal to each other in finite steps [4]. Furthermore, McKelvey and Page
extended their results to the situation where not posteriors themselves but some
statistics of posteriors are announced [5]. They showed that if statistics of
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posteriors satisfies some condition, convergence to common knowledge occurs.
In addition, Nielsen et al. extended the results of Ref. [5] for conditional
probability to conditional expectations [6]. Because, in many economic settings,
it is more natural to suppose that only some aggregate of individual information
(such as price) is announced instead of posteriors themselves, the results of Refs.
[5, 6] are useful in more realistic situation.
It has been considered that markets have power to compute the payoffs of
securities [7]. Feigenbaum et al. proposed a simple model of market where
the payoff of some security is computed from information distributed in players
through trades [8]. They showed that the equilibrium of this model is described
by the concept of common knowledge, and the necessary and sufficient condition
for the market to correctly compute the Boolean payoff for all priors is that the
payoff is described by a weighted threshold function. This model was further
investigated in Ref. [9], where effect of aggregate uncertainty was studied. How-
ever, computational power of even such simple model has not been completely
known. For example, computational power of this model when convergence for
all priors is not required has not been known.
In this paper, we investigate computational power of the distributed infor-
mation market model [8] for two classes of Boolean securities, that is, separable
(or parity) and totally symmetric, both of which are not necessarily the form of
weighted threshold function. We prove that the payoff of such securities can be
correctly computed by market when prior is described by some form.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce a model of
distributed information market. In section 3, we review previous results for this
model. In section 4, we introduce the concept of separable (or parity) securities
and prove that clearing price of these securities converges to the true value
when a common prior probability distribution of information of each player
is uniformly biased distribution. In section 5, we introduce totally symmetric
securities and prove that clearing price of these securities converges to the true
value when a common prior probability distribution of information of each player
is also totally symmetric and satisfies some condition. Section 6 is devoted to
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concluding remarks.
2. Model
We consider distributed information market model [8]. A set of players is
described as {1, · · · , N}. We assume that each player has one bit of information
about the true state of the world (private information). Private information of
player i is described as σi ∈ {1,−1} (not {0, 1}, for convenience). We also
assume that payoff of traded security is a Boolean function. For convenience,
we write the payoff of security as g(σ) ∈ {1,−1}, where we have defined σ ≡
(σ1, · · · , σN ). (The original payoff is obtained as (1+g)/2.) The functional form
of g(σ) is assumed to be common knowledge among all players. Furthermore, we
assume that all players have a common prior probability distribution P(σ) over
the values of σ. At time t ∈ Z, player i bids bi,t according to the expectation
of g(σ) conditional on her private information and a set of σ consistent with
previous clearing prices. (This rule is obtained by the assumption that players
are risk-neutral, myopic, and bid truthfully.) Market-price formulation process
is modeled by Shapley-Shubik market game [10] with restriction. Then, the
clearing price at this round is
ct+1 =
1
N
N∑
i=1
bi,t (1)
and net money gain of player i is ct+1 − bi,t. Probability distribution of σ for
each player is updated via Bayes’ rule.
Mathematically, the dynamics of this market when the true state of the
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world is σ is described as follows:
Pi,t (σˆ;σ) =
δσˆi,σiP
(ex)
t (σˆ;σ)∑
sˆ
δsˆi,σiP
(ex)
t (sˆ;σ)
(2)
bi,t (σ) =
∑
σˆ
g (σˆ)Pi,t (σˆ;σ) (3)
ct (σ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
bi,t−1 (σ) (4)
P
(ex)
t (σˆ;σ) =
I (ct (σˆ) = ct (σ))P
(ex)
t−1 (σˆ;σ)∑
sˆ
I (ct (sˆ) = ct (σ))P
(ex)
t−1 (sˆ;σ)
. (5)
with the initial condition
P
(ex)
0 (σˆ;σ) = P (σˆ) . (6)
Here we have introduced an indicator function I(· · · ) that returns 1 when · · ·
holds and 0 otherwise. The function P
(ex)
t (σˆ;σ) corresponds to the probability
distribution of the state σˆ at round t for external observer when the true state of
the world is σ. Similarly, the function Pi,t (σˆ;σ) corresponds to the probability
distribution of the state σˆ at round t for player i. bi,t (σ) is a bid of player i
at round t. ct (σ) is the clearing price at round t. We assume that the support
of P (σˆ) contains σ. Generally, in order to calculate P
(ex)
t (σˆ;σ), players and
external observer need to compute ct (σ) for all σ ∈ {1,−1}
N
and rule out σ
that is inconsistent with the actual clearing price.
It should be noted that Eq. (5) can be written as
P
(ex)
t (σˆ;σ) =
{∏t
t′=1 I (ct′ (σˆ) = ct′ (σ))
}
P (σˆ)∑
sˆ
{∏t
t′=1 I (ct′ (sˆ) = ct′ (σ))
}
P (sˆ)
. (7)
Equivalently, when we define a set
St (σ) ≡
{
σˆ ∈ {1,−1}N
∣∣∣ ct (σˆ) = ct (σ) , · · · , c1 (σˆ) = c1 (σ)} , (8)
Eq. (7) can be rewritten as
P
(ex)
t (σˆ;σ) =


P(σˆ)∑
sˆ∈St(σ) P(sˆ)
(σˆ ∈ St (σ))
0 (σˆ /∈ St (σ)) .
(9)
4
This implies P
(ex)
t (·;σ) = P
(ex)
t (·;σ
′) for ∀σ′ ∈ suppP
(ex)
t (·;σ) = S
t (σ).
Furthermore, the constraint ct (σˆ) = ct (σ) for each t in Eq. (5) effectively
gives a linear equation about σˆ [8]. In fact, for σˆ ∈ St (σ) we obtain
bi,t (σˆ) I
(
σˆ ∈ St (σ)
)
=
∑
sˆ∈St(σˆ) g (sˆ) δsˆi,σˆiP (sˆ)∑
sˆ∈St(σˆ) δsˆi,σˆiP (sˆ)
I
(
σˆ ∈ St (σ)
)
=
∑
sˆ∈St(σ) g (sˆ) δsˆi,σˆiP (sˆ)∑
sˆ∈St(σ) δsˆi,σˆiP (sˆ)
I
(
σˆ ∈ St (σ)
)
=
[
βi,t
(
St (σ)
)
+ γi,t
(
St (σ)
)
σˆi
]
I
(
σˆ ∈ St (σ)
)
(10)
with
βi,t
(
St (σ)
)
≡
1
2
{∑
sˆ∈St(σ) g (sˆ)P (sˆ) +
∑
sˆ∈St(σ) g (sˆ) sˆiP (sˆ)∑
sˆ∈St(σ) P (sˆ) +
∑
sˆ∈St(σ) sˆiP (sˆ)
+
∑
sˆ∈St(σ) g (sˆ)P (sˆ)−
∑
sˆ∈St(σ) g (sˆ) sˆiP (sˆ)∑
sˆ∈St(σ) P (sˆ)−
∑
sˆ∈St(σ) sˆiP (sˆ)
}
(11)
γi,t
(
St (σ)
)
≡
1
2
{∑
sˆ∈St(σ) g (sˆ)P (sˆ) +
∑
sˆ∈St(σ) g (sˆ) sˆiP (sˆ)∑
sˆ∈St(σ) P (sˆ) +
∑
sˆ∈St(σ) sˆiP (sˆ)
−
∑
sˆ∈St(σ) g (sˆ)P (sˆ)−
∑
sˆ∈St(σ) g (sˆ) sˆiP (sˆ)∑
sˆ∈St(σ) P (sˆ)−
∑
sˆ∈St(σ) sˆiP (sˆ)
}
.(12)
Then, the constraint ct+1 (σˆ) = ct+1 (σ) for σˆ ∈ S
t (σ) is equal to
1
N
N∑
i=1
[
βi,t
(
St (σ)
)
+ γi,t
(
St (σ)
)
σˆi
]
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
[
βi,t
(
St (σ)
)
+ γi,t
(
St (σ)
)
σi
]
,
(13)
which is linear with respect to {σˆi}.
3. Previous studies
For such market with information aggregation, properties of equilibrium
(t → ∞) have been investigated. The next theorem is application of general
theorem about common knowledge in Refs. [5, 6] to the distributed information
market model.
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Theorem 1 (Nielsen et al. [6]). Suppose that the true state of the world is σ.
At equilibrium,
∑
σˆ
g (σˆ)Pi,∞ (σˆ;σ) =
∑
σˆ
g (σˆ)P (ex)∞ (σˆ;σ) = c∞ (σ) (14)
holds for all i when common prior is consistent (that is, the support of P (σˆ)
contains σ). Furthermore, the convergence occurs in finite steps.
We call this equilibrium state as common knowledge equilibrium.
The next theorem gives the necessary and sufficient condition for ct (σ) to
converge to the true value g (σ) in t → ∞ for arbitrary (consistent) prior dis-
tribution. We denote step function as θ(· · · ).
Theorem 2 (Feigenbaum et al. [8]). The necessary and sufficient condition for
ct (σ) to converge to the true value g (σ) in t → ∞ for arbitrary (consistent)
prior P (σˆ) is that g (σ) is written as a weighted threshold function
g (σ) = 2θ
(
N∑
i=1
wiσi − 1
)
− 1 (15)
with some real constants w1, · · · , wN . Furthermore, the convergence occurs after
at most N rounds.
For example, when N = 2 and g (σ) = σ1σ2 (which corresponds to XOR
function), ct (σ) does not converge to the true value g (σ) for uniform prior
distribution P (σˆ) = 1/4.
4. Separable security
Because of Theorem 2, clearing price of a security which cannot be written
as a weighted threshold function does not necessarily converge to the true value
g (σ). In this paper, as one class of Boolean securities, we consider separable
securities, which are of the form
g (σ) =
N∏
i=1
gi (σi) (16)
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and each gi takes the value in {1,−1}. The general form of gi is
gi (σi) = (−1)
ai+ri
1−σi
2
= (−1)aiσrii (17)
where ai ∈ {0, 1} and ri ∈ {0, 1}. Therefore, separable securities can also be
called parity securities. The number of separable securities is 2N+1, and it is
much smaller than the number of all possible securities 22
N
. Securities of this
form contain XOR security, and therefore they are not necessarily written as a
weighted threshold function.
It should be noted that when prior P (σˆ) depends on the true state of the
world σ such as P (σˆ) = δσˆ,σ, convergence to the true value g (σ) trivially
occurs. Therefore, we investigate only priors which assign non-zero probability
for ∀σˆ ∈ {1,−1}
N
and do not depend on σ.
The next proposition is the first main result of this paper.
Proposition 1. Suppose that a security is separable and a common prior prob-
ability distribution is of the form (uniformly biased distribution)
P (σˆ) =
N∏
i=1
ehσˆi
2 cosh (h)
. (18)
Then, for h 6= 0, ct (σ) converges to the true value g (σ) in t→∞.
Proof. We explicitly calculate the time evolution. First, bids of players at t = 0
are
bi,0 (σ) =
∑
σˆ
{∏N
j=1(−1)
ajσ
rj
j
}
δσˆi,σiP (σˆ)∑
σˆ
δσˆi,σiP (σˆ)
= (−1)
∑N
j=1 ajσrii
∏
j 6=i
tanhrj (h) . (19)
Then, the clearing price at the first round is
c1 (σ) =
1
N
(−1)
∑
N
j=1 aj
N∑
i=1
σrii
∏
j 6=i
tanhrj (h) . (20)
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Next, posterior probability distribution for external observer at t = 1 is
P
(ex)
1 (σˆ;σ) =
I
(∑N
i=1 σˆ
ri
i
∏
j 6=i tanh
rj (h) =
∑N
i=1 σ
ri
i
∏
j 6=i tanh
rj (h)
)∏N
j=1 e
hσˆj
∑
sˆ
I
(∑N
i=1 sˆ
ri
i
∏
j 6=i tanh
rj (h) =
∑N
i=1 σ
ri
i
∏
j 6=i tanh
rj (h)
)∏N
j=1 e
hsˆj
=
I
(∑
k:rk=1
σˆk =
∑
k:rk=1
σk
)∏N
j=1 e
hσˆj∑
sˆ
I
(∑
k:rk=1
sˆk =
∑
k:rk=1
σk
)∏N
j=1 e
hsˆj
. (21)
In order to obtain the second line, we have used rj ∈ {0, 1} and the assumption
h 6= 0. Then, for h 6= 0, bids of players at t = 1 are
bi,1 (σ) =
∑
σˆ
{∏N
j=1(−1)
aj σˆ
rj
j
}
δσˆi,σiP
(ex)
1 (σˆ;σ)∑
σˆ
δσˆi,σiP
(ex)
1 (σˆ;σ)
=
∑
σˆ
{∏N
j=1(−1)
aj σˆ
rj
j
}
δσˆi,σiI
(∑
k:rk=1
σˆk =
∑
k:rk=1
σk
)∏N
j=1 e
hσˆj∑
σˆ
δσˆi,σiI
(∑
k:rk=1
σˆk =
∑
k:rk=1
σk
)∏N
j=1 e
hσˆj
=
{∏N
j=1(−1)
aj
}
σrii
∑rj=1
{σˆj}j 6=i
{∏j 6=i
j:rj=1
σˆj
}
I
(∑k 6=i
k:rk=1
σˆk =
∑k 6=i
k:rk=1
σk
)∏j 6=i
j:rj=1
ehσˆj∑rj=1
{σˆj}j 6=i
I
(∑k 6=i
k:rk=1
σˆk =
∑k 6=i
k:rk=1
σk
)∏j 6=i
j:rj=1
ehσˆj
=
{∏N
j=1(−1)
aj
}
σrii
∑rj=1
{σˆj}j 6=i
{∏j 6=i
j:rj=1
(−1)
1−σˆj
2
}
I
(∑k 6=i
k:rk=1
σˆk =
∑k 6=i
k:rk=1
σk
)∏j 6=i
j:rj=1
ehσˆj∑rj=1
{σˆj}j 6=i
I
(∑k 6=i
k:rk=1
σˆk =
∑k 6=i
k:rk=1
σk
)∏j 6=i
j:rj=1
ehσˆj
=
N∏
j=1
(−1)ajσ
rj
j
= g (σ) , (22)
which implies that convergence to the true price occurs. We note that in the
third line, we have calculated the sum with respect to {σˆj} with rj = 0 or j = i
in both denominator and numerator. In fact, at t = 2
c2 (σ) = g (σ) (23)
P
(ex)
2 (σˆ;σ) =
I (g (σˆ) = g (σ)) I (c1 (σˆ) = c1 (σ))P (σˆ)∑
sˆ
I (g (sˆ) = g (σ)) I (c1 (sˆ) = c1 (σ))P (sˆ)
(24)
and
bi,2 (σ) =
∑
σˆ
g (σˆ) δσˆi,σiP
(ex)
2 (σˆ;σ)∑
σˆ
δσˆi,σiP
(ex)
2 (σˆ;σ)
= g (σ) , (25)
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and convergence indeed occurs.
This result suggests that when there is a common trend in private informa-
tion of players, convergence to the true value occurs. It should be noted that
when h = 0, bi,0 (σ) = 0 and convergence to the true price does not occur.
5. Totally symmetric security
Here, as another class of Boolean securities, we investigate totally symmetric
securities. When we define σpi ≡
(
σpi(1), · · · , σpi(N)
)
with a permutation pi on
{1, · · · , N}, a totally symmetric security is defined as a security with
g (σpi) = g (σ) (26)
for arbitrary permutation pi. The general form of totally symmetric securities is
g (σ) =
N∑
k=0
AkI

 N∑
j=1
σj = −N + 2k

 (27)
with Ak ∈ {1,−1}. The number of totally symmetric securities is 2
N+1. To-
tally symmetric securities are not necessarily written as a weighted threshold
function.
The next proposition is the second main result of this paper.
Proposition 2. Suppose that a security is totally symmetric and a common
prior probability distribution is also totally symmetric, that is,
P (σˆpi) = P (σˆ) (28)
for arbitrary permutation pi. Then, if the relation
∑
sˆ
g (sˆ) sˆiP (sˆ) 6=
{∑
sˆ
g (sˆ)P (sˆ)
}{∑
sˆ
sˆiP (sˆ)
}
(29)
holds (the both-hand sides of which do not depend on i), ct (σ) converges to the
true value g (σ) in t→∞.
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Proof. We explicitly calculate the time evolution. First, bids of players at t = 0
are
bi,0 (σ) =
∑
σˆ
g (σˆ) δσˆi,σiP (σˆ)∑
σˆ
δσˆi,σiP (σˆ)
= β0 + γ0σi (30)
where we have defined
β0 ≡
1
2
{∑
sˆ
g (sˆ)P (sˆ) +
∑
sˆ
g (sˆ) sˆiP (sˆ)∑
sˆ
P (sˆ) +
∑
sˆ
sˆiP (sˆ)
+
∑
sˆ
g (sˆ)P (sˆ)−
∑
sˆ
g (sˆ) sˆiP (sˆ)∑
sˆ
P (sˆ)−
∑
sˆ
sˆiP (sˆ)
}
(31)
γ0 ≡
1
2
{∑
sˆ
g (sˆ)P (sˆ) +
∑
sˆ
g (sˆ) sˆiP (sˆ)∑
sˆ
P (sˆ) +
∑
sˆ
sˆiP (sˆ)
−
∑
sˆ
g (sˆ)P (sˆ)−
∑
sˆ
g (sˆ) sˆiP (sˆ)∑
sˆ
P (sˆ)−
∑
sˆ
sˆiP (sˆ)
}
(32)
according to Eqs. (11) and (12). It should be noted that the right-hand sides of
Eqs. (31) and (32) do not depend on i because g and P are totally symmetric.
Then, the clearing price at the first round is
c1 (σ) = β0 + γ0
1
N
N∑
i=1
σi. (33)
Next, posterior probability distribution for external observer at t = 1 is
P
(ex)
1 (σˆ;σ) =
I
(
γ0
∑N
i=1 σˆi = γ0
∑N
i=1 σi
)
P (σˆ)∑
sˆ
I
(
γ0
∑N
i=1 sˆi = γ0
∑N
i=1 σi
)
P (sˆ)
. (34)
By using the assumption (29), that is, γ0 6= 0, we obtain
P
(ex)
1 (σˆ;σ) =
I
(∑N
i=1 σˆi =
∑N
i=1 σi
)
P (σˆ)∑
sˆ
I
(∑N
i=1 sˆi =
∑N
i=1 σi
)
P (sˆ)
. (35)
Then, bids of players at t = 1 are
bi,1 (σ) =
∑
σˆ
g (σˆ) δσˆi,σiP
(ex)
1 (σˆ;σ)∑
σˆ
δσˆi,σiP
(ex)
1 (σˆ;σ)
=
∑
σˆ
g (σˆ) δσˆi,σiI
(∑N
j=1 σˆj =
∑N
j=1 σj
)
P (σˆ)∑
σˆ
δσˆi,σiI
(∑N
j=1 σˆj =
∑N
j=1 σj
)
P (σˆ)
=
∑
σˆ
g (σ) δσˆi,σiI
(∑N
j=1 σˆj =
∑N
j=1 σj
)
P (σˆ)∑
σˆ
δσˆi,σiI
(∑N
j=1 σˆj =
∑N
j=1 σj
)
P (σˆ)
= g (σ) , (36)
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where we have used the fact that the value of a totally symmetric Boolean func-
tion is determined only by
∑N
j=1 σˆj (Eq. (27)). This implies that convergence
to the true price occurs (similarly to Proposition 1).
We remark that convergence to the true price does not occur when γ0 = 0.
6. Discussion
In this paper, we have investigated equilibrium of iterative process in which
the clearing price is publicly announced and players revise their bids according
to the public information and their own private information, in distributed in-
formation market model with two classes of Boolean securities, that is, separable
and totally symmetric. As is well known, the equilibrium state of this model is
described by the concept of common knowledge. We have theoretically showed
that the clearing price of separable securities converges to the true value when a
common prior probability distribution of information of each player is uniformly
biased distribution. In contrast, when a common prior probability distribution
is uniform distribution over {1,−1}
N
, convergence to the true value does not
occur. We have also theoretically showed that the clearing price of totally sym-
metric securities converges to the true value when a common prior probability
distribution of information of each player satisfies some condition.
The convergence to the true price in separable and totally symmetric se-
curities seems to come from the fact that structure of g−1(1) and g−1(−1) is
simple. As we can see in Eqs. (22) and (36), although convergence to the true
price occurs, players cannot know the true state σ, and convergence seems to
come from degeneracy of the set of σ with the same clearing price in g−1(1)
or g−1(−1). For securities which are not separable or totally symmetric, sit-
uation will be more complicated. Finding general priors for non-separable or
non-totally-symmetric securities and elucidating the relation between geometry
of g−1(1) and g−1(−1) and appropriate priors for convergence to the true price
is an important future problem.
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In this paper, we only considered noiseless situation, where each process of
the time evolution is accurate and precise. However, this assumption is not
realistic. If noise exists, convergence of the iterative process of this model to the
true state may not occur, by convergence to wrong states. There are various ori-
gins of noises in game-theoretic situations [11]. In our setting, significant noises
may come from rounding error in calculation of clearing price, effect of irrational
players, and incompleteness of information of players. Related to the last point,
authors of Ref. [9] investigated the situation where the state of the world cannot
be fully determined even if information of all players is pooled together. They
found that convergence property of the distributed information market model
becomes worse in specific examples when such aggregate uncertainty exists. In-
vestigating whether previous results and our result can be extended to noisy
situations or not is another important future problem.
Related to the above remark, considering learning process in Eq. (5) would
be interesting. Because players and external observer need to compute ct (σ)
for all σ ∈ {1,−1}
N
and rule out σ that is inconsistent with the actual clear-
ing price, it needs much computational costs. It is more realistic that players
gradually learn σ by calculation with low computational costs (that is, players
are bounded-rational). Research in this direction is needed.
Furthermore, we are also interested in common knowledge equilibrium of
other model such as market scoring rule [12, 13, 14]. Market scoring rule is
another model of information market (or prediction market), and it is myopi-
cally incentive compatible. In addition, when logarithmic market scoring rule
is adopted, analysis in terms of information theory is possible [13, 14]. We will
perform information theoretical analysis of the common knowledge equilibrium
in future.
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